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a g a i n s t t h e a p p e l l a n t w i t h o u t f i r s t r e c e i v i n g a d e q u a t e 
f o u n d a t i o n a l p r o o f of a c o n s p i r a c y . 
I I I . The l o w e r c o u r t e r r e d i n d e n y i n g t h e a p p e l l a n t ' s 
r e q u e s t f o r a b i l l of p a r t i c u l a r s . 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES, ETC. 
Issue I. Sections 76-8-510 and 76-4-101. 
Issue II. Rule 801, U.R.E.; Rule 104, U.R.E. 
Issue III. Rule 4, U.R.Cr.P. 
Copies of the authorities appear in the addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant was indicted by the so-called 1986 
special Salt Lake County grand jury on October 9, 1986. The 
indictment alleged he commited the offenses of conspiracy, a 
third degree felony; tampering with evidence, a second degree 
felony- tampering with a witness, a third degree felony; and 
official misconduct, a Class B misdemeanor (R. 2-5).* Each 
charge was predicated upon an allegation that the appellant had 
in some way altered or concealed a report by a subordinate which 
pertained to the origin of a fire in an office building. Jury 
trial began on February 17, 1987, and concluded on March 7, 1987, 
at 4:11 a.m. (R. 223, 342). Mr. Harman, a highly regarded 
18-year veteran of law enforcement (vol. 11, 9, 112), was 
acquitted of all of the charges brought by the grand jury (R. 
342). However, he was convicted of a lesser included offense 
of attempted evidence tampering (R. 342). He was sentenced on 
May 5, 1987, for the commission of a Class A misdemeanor and 
*As many as three court reporters prepared the record in this 
case. Citations to page numbers only are to volumes prepared 
by the principal reporter, Robert Lewis. Citations to volumes 
prepared by other reporters will include the volume number. 
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a notice of appeal was filed on May 11, 1987 (R. 504, 507). 
Thereafter, a motion for a new trial was filed by a co-defendant 
in which this appellant did not join. Nevertheless, when that 
motion was denied on October 8, 1987, this appellant filed a 
second notice of appeal on October 16, 1987, to protect the 
record in the event it was deemed he did join in the new trial 
motion (R. supplemental). 
This case began with a fire at the Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza on May 1, 1983, which caused in excess of 
$1,000,000.00 damage (R. 274). Two months earlier the Murray 
City Fire Department had sent a warning to an occupant of the 
building, Salt Lake County Mental Health, concerning fire hazards 
presented by the improper use of space heaters and extension 
cords (R. 271). The cause of the fire was investigated by C. 
Dean Larsen, assistant chief of the same department (R. 268). 
Larsen was of the opinion that large fires are 
difficult to analyze for an origin and this was the largest ever 
in Murray history (R. 293). Nevertheless, on the same evening 
the fire began, he appeared on television holding an electric 
space heater and extension cord which he identified as the cause 
of the fire (R. 977, 479). The heater and cord came from the 
premises leased by Salt Lake County Mental Health, and Larsen 
concluded that the fire began there (R. 286) . He then selected 
a laboratory in Dallas, Texas, to scientifically examine the 
heater and cord for evidence that they were in fact the cause 
of the fire (R. 975). 
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Salt Lake County, which was self-insured for liability 
purposes, began its own investigation as soon as Larsen1s opinion 
became known (R. 346, 359, 479). Initially, Evan Stephens, the 
County's risk manager, sought assistance from the County 
Attorney's criminal investigative staff. This staff had never 
been utilized for a civil fire investigation before (R. 480), 
and indeed, the investigator's office initially recorded the 
case as a request to assist Murray City in investigating an arson 
(R. 785). The County sent Olin Yearby and Ralph Tolman to the 
scene, then the only people in the office with fire investigation 
experience (R. 573). It was the 250th case of the year to date 
for that office (R. 576). 
Tolman and Yearby were told by their supervisor, 
Appellant Harman, to merely assist Murray Fire in its 
investigation (R. 588). No instructions were given to them to 
try to reduce the County's potential liability (]£•)• Upon 
their arrival at the scene, Dean Larsen immediately gave them 
his opinion concerning the heater as the cause of the fire and 
the origin being located in Salt Lake County premises (R. 589). 
Larsen and Tolman were close social friends and began to work 
at the scene together (R. 876-878, 896). 
The following day, Lou Midgeley and Bill Hyde, Deputy 
County Attorneys, and Evan Stephens, the risk manager, elected 
to hire an independent investigator (R. 362, 514). Stephens 
was concerned over Tolman's apparent dependence on Larsen (R. 
506, 383) . No previous fire involved both County and other 
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property so it also became necessary for the first time to hire 
an outside expert to avoid the appearance of a conflict of 
interest or bias (R. 481). Harman had no role in that decision 
and was not present when it was made (R. 481, 476). 
Stephens wrote a letter to Harman notifying him of 
the decision to retain James Ashby as dn outside expert (R. 
385). Harman (Vol. 11, 134), his subordinate, Sam Dawson (R. 
734) , and Bill Hyde, chief of the civil division, all interpreted 
the letter as pulling the investigation tanit off of the job of 
assisting Murray Fire (R. 514, 518-520). Harman and Dawson 
believed the reason was because no arson evidence had been found 
(R. 130, 134, 734). 
Ashby was a competitor of Dean Larsen's (R. 626). 
He had once worked with Tolman in a special fire investigation 
unit funded by the federal government in which he, not Tolman, 
found the cause and origin of fires (R. 620, 662). Tolman, in 
fact, had never written a cause and origin report on a fire (R. 
1276) , and in the view of a nationally recognized expert, lacked 
the expertise to do so (Vol. 18, 68). A£hby, in contrast, was 
characterized even by Larsen as an hones^ man "who couldn't be 
bought" (R. 293, 965), and by others as tiie leading fire expert 
in the state (R. 591) and one of the best in the country (R. 
1193). Ashby now had the benefit of the report on the heater 
and cord from the laboratory in Dallas. The report showed 
conclusively that there had been no electricity in the cord when 
it burned; consequently, it could not possibly have been the 
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cause of the fire (R. 975, 977, 660). The national expert 
concurred (Vol. 18, 65). From other evidence, such as interviews 
Larsen failed to conduct, Ashby concluded the fire began outside 
of the County's premises (R. 661). 
Larsen, in spite of scientific evidence to the 
contrary, continued to adhere to the heater theory (R. 904). 
He had, however, no support for the theory so he and his fire 
chief began to telephone Tolman, their friend, and ask for his 
help in supporting his conclusion (R. 888, 915-916, 986-988). 
Larsen's pride, in his own words, had been hurt (R. 988). 
Tolman was also at the same time receiving pressure 
from his immediate supervisor, Sam Dawson, to finish his report 
(R. 693, 735). Dawson expected it to be short because Tolman 
had been at the scene for only a few hours on one day (R. 735) . 
Sometime after August 1, 1983, he received instead a seven-page 
report (Exhibit 8) . Tolman had never prepared such a report 
before (R. 600). Tolman simultaneously provided a copy to either 
Wendell Coombs, the Murray Fire Chief (R, 864), or his assistant, 
Larsen (R. 981). There had been in effect for two years at that 
time a written office policy forbidding dissemination of reports 
outside of the County Attorney's office (R. 759, 773, 783, 
Exhibit 783) . 
Dawson refused to accept the report because Tolman 
had not provided citation to authorities for observations he 
could not have personally made (R. 767). He believed it made 
the County look bad (R. 793). He then took the report to Harman, 
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who took it to Bill Hyde, chief of the civil division (Vol. 11, 
138-141) . Evan Stephens (R. 392) , Harman (R. 509) , Lou Midgeley, 
another deputy county attorney (Vol. 11, 144), and Dawson (R. 
767) all believed the report to be thejwork product of Dean 
Larsen. While Tolman, who had the Dallas laboratory report when 
he prepared his report, did not identify the heater and cord 
as the "cause" of the fire, he did locate the "origin" of the 
fire at the same site as Larsen. The only device which could 
cause a fire at that site was the heater and cord (R. 886, 967). 
This was the only report at the time to back Larsen's opinion 
(R. 986) . 
In a crucial series of facts which were never known 
to Tolman (R. 1276), Harman provided copies of the report to 
Hyde (R. 512) and Stephens (R. 389). Stephens showed a copy 
to a Glen Bammerlin (R. 394) and ultimatelly gave a copy to Ralph 
Crockett, another deputy county attorney (Vol. 11, 94). Hyde 
made Tolman's opinion known to the County Commission as early 
as late August 1983 (R. 521). Harman nevfer approached Hyde (R. 
526), Stephens (R. 486), or Crockett (Vol. 11, 94) and suggested 
to them what to do with their copies. 
Harman returned his copy of tine report to Tolman. 
He told him to write a more concise repojrt reflecting what he 
personally had done (Vol. 11, 147* 787). Sam Dawson also 
expected Tolman would delete information other than his personal 
observations (R. 793)• Harman had never approved a report Dawson 
first rejected (R. 849). Harman also told Tolman to include 
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a r e f e r e n c e t o t h e C o u n t y ' s r e t e n t i o n of James A s h b y ' s 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n (R. 148 , 8 4 2 ) . He was not i n s t r u c t e d to " shor t 
form" t h e r e p o r t , an o f f i c e euphemism for a one -page r e p o r t . 
U l t i m a t e l y , Tolman s u b m i t t e d a one -page r e p o r t d e t a i l i n g what 
he p e r s o n a l l y did and r e f e r r i n g to Ashby's r e p o r t (Exhibi t 7 ) . 
Harman never t o l d Tolman to change h i s opinion or how 
t o t e s t i f y in any c o u r t p r o c e e d i n g s (R. 1 2 7 3 ) . He never to ld 
Tolman what t o do with the o r i g i n a l r epo r t (R. 1276) . He never 
t o l d O l i n Y e a r b y , who was wi th Tolman and who had t h e same 
o p i n i o n , how t o t e s t i f y , to keep qu ie t or to change h i s opinion 
(R. 5 9 4 ) . Harman never to ld Joan Binkerd, who typed the r e p o r t , 
how to t e s t i f y or forget what she typed (R. 715) . 
The o r i g i n a l r e p o r t was r e t u r n e d t o T o l m a n 1 s 
i n v e s t i g a t i v e f i l e in a c c o r d a n c e wi th common o f f i c e p r a c t i c e 
(R. 1 2 7 4 ) . The f i l e c o n t a i n e d two o t h e r d r a f t s of the r epo r t 
and 26 o t h e r i t ems (R. 1 1 5 6 - 1 1 5 7 ) . Harman had access to t h a t 
f i l e t h r o u g h o u t 1983 , 1984, 1985 and up to 1986 when i t became 
the focus of c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n (Vol. 1 1 , 152) . The i n v e s t i g a t o r ' s 
f i l e , wi th t h e r e p o r t s , i s t he on ly f i l e an i n v e s t i g a t o r takes 
t o c o u r t or d e p o s i t i o n s (R. 6 0 1 ; V o l . 1 1 , 1 5 1 ) . The County 
A t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e , B i l l Hyde and Ralph Crocket t f u l l y expected 
Tolman to be deposed in any c i v i l l i t i g a t i o n and give h i s opinion 
(R. 526; Vol . 1 1 , 29 ) . 
C i v i l l i t i g a t i o n over r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the f i r e began 
in 1984 (R. 5 4 9 ) . Ralph Crocke t t , who had Tolman's r e p o r t , was 
e x c l u s i v e l y r e s p o n s i b i l e for conducting the de fense , not Harman 
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(Vol. 11/ 22). Harman was not a defendant and was not at risk 
financially (R. 474) . Crockett resisted £ request for documents 
which could have included Tolman1 s report <j>n work product grounds 
(Vol. 11, 22). None of the other attorneys challenged this 
assertion by a motion to compel discovery (Vol. llf 25, 38). 
In November 1984, Dean Larsen lied unde}: oath in a deposition 
by stating he knew Tolman had done a rebort but he had never 
seen it (R. 938, 952). Again, none of tlje 11 attorneys present 
attempted to get a copy of the report or Repose Tolman (Vol. 11, 
29) . 
At the trial of the present c^se, hearsay evidence 
was received against Harman in the form of statements that Tolman 
had made to others. The evidence was received over Harman1s 
continuing objection that no conspiracy hlad been shown (R. 866; 
Vol. 18, 6) . 
The first such statement came from Wendel Coombs. 
Coombs claimed he received a copy of the Ireport from Tolman who 
said Harman wanted it torn up because it made the County look 
liable (R. 869). However, in grand jury testimony, Coombs never 
mentioned tearing the report up or County liability (R. 880-884). 
Larsen related a series of similar statements. He 
claimed he got the report from Coombs (Ri. 914) and that Tolman 
said to him—not Coombs — burn it, Harman thinks it will cost 
the County millions (R. 919). However, he Admitted only recently 
remembering the statement concerning costing the County millions 
after failing to mention it in two prior depositions (R. 978) . 
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His explanation was his memory was improving with the passage 
of time (R. 1007). Neither he (R. 985) nor Coombs (R. 884) 
reported these statements to anyone when they claimed Tolman 
made them. 
The final hearsay statements came from a news reporter 
who was seeking to create a story, told Tolman he could be a 
hero (Vol. 18, 10) and claimed Tolman said Harman knew Larsen 
had the report and Harman wanted it "shit-canned" (Vol. 18, 19). 
This must be contrasted with Larsen1s hearsay where Larsen 
claimed Tolman wanted the existence of the report concealed from 
Harman. 
In contrast to the hearsay are Tolman's own statements 
and contemporaneous statements made to his friends. Tolman said 
he was never told to destroy it; his only concern was the fact 
he released it without authorization (Vol. 18, 37, 47; 1276). 
He told his friend Mike Christensen, another deputy county 
attorney, that he had only been accused of "parroting" Dean 
Larsen; that he never was told to destroy it; that he never told 
Larsen to destroy it; and that his only concern was its 
unauthorized release (R. 1198, 1207, 1218). He told Olin Yearby 
the day Larsen disclosed the report that he never told Larsen 
that Harman wanted the report destroyed and that he wished Larsen 
had just given the report to the civil attorneys rather than 
lying about it (R. 593). Finally, at the same time, he called 
Jim Ashby and told him Harman never told him to destroy the 
report and that the only reason the report was rejected was 
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because it plagiarized Dean Larsen's opinion (R. 678). Tolman 
also said to Sam Dawson that if he was fir^d for the unauthorized 
release of the report, he "would take Harnjan with him" (R. 778) . 
For his part, Harman was angry at Tolman because a month earlier 
he had defended Tolman in an unrelated disciplinary hearing for 
fighting with the newsman who now was goling to make him a hero 
(R. 782). 
Harman1 s motion for a judgment! of acquittal at the 
close of the State's case was denied (Vol|. 18, 58; 1143, 1146). 
During jury deliberations, the State dismissed the evidence 
tampering charge againt Tolman (R. 1460). £rior to trial, Harman 
filed a bill of particulars, discovery request and motion for 
preliminary proof of a conspiracy before admitting hearsay (R. 
27-32). It was necessary to file a motion to compel the 
discovery (R. 100-101). The State resisted'discovery on the 
basis of State v. Faux, 9 U.2d 350, 345 p.2d 186 (1959). The 
State claimed to have an open file polic^, but that consisted 
of defense counsel only being permitted to e|xamine the voluminous 
materials in the prosecutor's office (R. 4|) . The State refused 
to answer the bill of particulars (R. 24),, and the request was 
denied by the Court (R. 160). Although presented with the issue, 
the Court did not rule on the existence) of a conspiracy as 
requested (R. 159) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The evidence was not sufficjient to convict the 
appellant of any crime. 
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2 . The lower cour t e r red in f a i l i n g to make a f inding 
in a d v a n c e of t h e t r i a l a s t o whether t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t 
e v i d e n c e of a c o n s p i r a c y t o j u s t i f y a d m i s s i o n of h e a r s a y 
ev idence . The lower cour t fu r the r er red in f inding in the course 
of t h e t r i a l t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence of a conspi racy 
to admit hea r say . 
3 . The lower c o u r t e r r e d in f a i l i n g t o r e q u i r e the 
s p e c i a l p r o s e c u t o r s t o respond t o t he r e q u e s t for a b i l l of 
p a r t i c u l a r s . The b i l l r e q u e s t e d t h a t t he s p e c i a l p rosecu to r s 
s p e c i f y how t h e a p p e l l a n t t a m p e r e d w i t h e v i d e n c e . Such 
i n f o r m a t i o n was v i t a l t o the d e f e n d a n t ' s a b i l i t y to prepare h i s 
de fense . 
I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
THE APPELLANT. 
The appellant, it must be recalled, was acquitted of 
all charges brought against him by the grand jury. His sole 
conviction was for the offense of attempted tampering with 
evidence, an offense "included" in Count II of the indictment. 
Count II alleged that Harman, believing an official proceeding 
or investigation was pending or about to be instituted, did, 
with Ralph Tolman, alter, destroy or conceal his report with 
the purpose to impair its verity or availability; all in 
violation of §76-8-510. To "attempt" to commit that offense, 
it was necessary for Harman to engage in conduct constituting 
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a s u b s t a n t i a l s t e p toward commission of the o f f ense , §76-4-101* 
The s p e c i a l p rosecu to r s proved no such o f f ense . 
The a p p e l l a n t i s w e l l aware t h a t " [ i ] n r ev i ewing a 
d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n , we do not s u b s t i t u t e our judgment for 
t h a t of the j u r y . 'So long as the re i s some evidence , inc luding 
r e a s o n a b l e i n f e r e n c e s , from which f indings of a l l the r e q u i s i t e 
elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inqui ry s t o p s . 1 
S t a t e v . Booker , 709 P.2d 342, 345 ( 1 9 8 5 ) , " S t a t e v . K a l i s z , 
735 P.2d 60 , 61 (Utah , 1 9 8 7 ) . N e v e r t h e l e s s , in s p i t e of t h i s 
heavy b u r d e n , t he Supreme Court has neveir h e s i t a t e d to reverse 
c o n v i c t i o n s where t h e S t a t e f a i l ed to proye i t s c a s e . in every 
c a s e , a j u ry had f i r s t convicted the a p p e l l a n t . 
In S t a t e v . K a l i s z , s u p r a , tlnie d e f e n d a n t came t o 
a used ca r l o t wi th a Mr. Remington, drove off for a few hours 
on a t e s t d r i v e , and r e t u r n e d a few ljiours l a t e r w i t h o u t 
Remington . He l i e d about h i s whereabou t s in the i n t e r v e n i n g 
t i m e . Minutes b e f o r e h i s r e t u r n , Remington had robbed a s t o r e 
and escaped in t he same type of c a r . KajLisz's c o n v i c t i o n of 
armed robbery was reversed on i n s u f f i c i e n t qvidence grounds. 
In j3t,£j:e!_ v ^ _ L J. n den , 666 P .2d 875 ( U t a h , 1 9 8 3 ) , 
a n o t h e r pe r cur iam d e c i s i o n , t h e a p p e l l a n t bought two b l a c k 
p l a s t i c gas cans s i m i l a r t o two found la t te r t he same evening 
a t a burned home. He was c o n v i c t e d of arjson of the home. The 
c o n v i c t i o n was r e v e r s e d on t h e g r o u n d t h e e v i d e n c e was 
i n s u f f i c i e n t . 
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I n
 State v, Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah, 1983), the 
appellant was convicted of murder. The body of a 15-year-old 
girl was found in a vegetable pit. She was last seen with the 
appellant. He left the next day for Las Vegas. While there, 
he "dreamed" of slapping her and that perhaps he hurt or killed 
her in a field, at 446. His conviction was reversed on 
insufficient evidence grounds. 
The "evidence" against Harman must be measured against 
these decisions. It was never disputed that Harman, like Dawson, 
instructed Tolman to rewrite his report to include only his 
observations, or that he was directred to refer to the County's 
retained expert, James Ashby. The other "evidence" is gross 
hearsay. Coombs reported Tolman as stating he needed the report 
destroyed because Harman felt it would make the County look 
liable. Larsen first claimed Tolman made the statement to him, 
not Coombs. Neither Larsen or Coombs, both of whom were peace 
officers, ever reported this "crime" to anyone. Neither gave 
Harman the courtesy of a phone call to explore the allegation. 
Finally, 28 months later, after Larsen revealed the existence 
of the report, after Tolman was in trouble for the unauthorized 
release of the report and after Tolman told Dawson he would take 
Harman with him if he was fired for the unauthorized release, 
Tolman told a newsman, who first told him he could be a hero, 
that Harman wanted the report destroyed. This so-called evidence 
must be contrasted with the tangible facts of the case. 
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At the same time he allegedly mdde these statements, 
Tolman told three friends and colleagues, Yearby, Ashby and 
Christensen, that Harman never told him to destroy the report 
and that he never told Larsen to destroy it. He told all three 
that the only problem with the report in Herman's mind was that 
it plagiarized and parroted Larsen's report. He told all three 
that his only problem was its unauthorized release. The County 
Attorney's office had a strict policy not to release reports 
outside of the office since 1981. The need for confidentiality 
in a prosecutor's office and the lack of ^ sinister motive for 
such a policy ought to be obvious. 
Tolman was also unaware that at the time he was telling 
others, if he did tell them, that Harman wanted the report 
destroyed, Harman had already provided three copies of the report 
to the civil division of the County Attorney's office (Hyde, 
Stephens and Crockett). Tolman did not know the County 
Commission knew his opinion. He did not know Hyde and Crockett 
knew his opinion and expected him to be deposed about it. He 
did not know or understand the work product exception to civil 
discovery which the attorneys, not Harman, l[iad asserted in 1984. 
He admitted he was not told to destroy his own copy of the 
report, change his opinion or testify in any certain way. He 
returned his report to his file, the file ah investigator always 
brings to court or depositions. Harman had access to the file 
and removed none of the 29 items it contained. 
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Harman knew Yearby had been to the fire and shared 
Tolman's opinion, Harman never approached Yearby to change his 
opinion or cover it up, Harman knew Joanie Binkerd typed the 
report. He never approached her and suggested forgetting it 
or testifying in any particular way. He knew Dawson was aware 
of the report and made no effort to influence his testimony. 
The decision to release the report belonged to Hyde and Crockett, 
not Harman. Finally, it is notable that the special prosecutors 
dismissed this very charge against Tolman when the indictment 
alleged he acted in concert with Harman to tamper with the 
report. 
Harman did nothing to attempt to impair the 
availability of the report. The report was in Tolman's file, 
as it would be in every case. Harman in fact enhanced its 
availability by making it available to the civil division for 
copying, a fact unknown to Tolman as he sought to recover the 
copy he released out of the office without authority. In no 
way, shape or form did Don Harman, a man respected by prosecutors 
for his honesty, commit or attempt to commit any act which 
altered, destroyed or concealed Ralph Tolman1s report. 
II 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING HEARSAY 
E V I D E N C E AGAINST THE APPELLANT WITHOUT 
ADEQUATE FOUNDATIONAL PROOF OF CONSPIRACY. 
As h a s b e e n s e e n , t h e c l a i m e d e v i d e n c e a g a i n s t M r . 
H a r m a n on t h e a t t e m p t e d e v i d e n c e t a m p e r i n g c h a r g e was e n t i r e l y 
h e a r s a y . I t was a d m i t t e d p u r s u a n t t o R u l e 8 0 1 ( d ) ( 2 ) ( E ) , U . R . E . , 
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to c o - c o n s p i r a t o r e x c e p t i o n to the hearsay r u l e . Harman, p r io r 
t o t r i a l , r e q u e s t e d u n s u c c e s s f u l l y t o have the Court hold a 
h e a r i n g t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r a c o n s p r i a c y e x i s t e d b e f o r e 
a d m i t t i n g h e a r s a y . During t r i a l , the appe l l an t objected to the 
i n t r o d u c t i o n of h e a r s a y on the ground no c o n s p i r a c y had been 
shown. The Court found some u n s p e c i f i e d e v i d e n c e of a cover 
up and a d m i t t e d t he e v i d e n c e of L a r s e n , Coombs and Har r ing ton . 
In each i n s t a n c e , e r r o r was committed. 
A p p e l l a n t ' s e f f o r t to r equ i r e the p rosecu t ion to submit 
t h r e s h o l d p r o o f of c o n s p i r a c y in advance of t r i a l was made 
p u r s u a n t t o Rule 1 0 4 ( a ) , U . R . E . Rule 1 0 4 ( a ) p r o v i d e s in 
p e r t i n e n t p a r t , " P r e l i m i n a r y q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g . . . t h e 
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of e v i d e n c e s h a l l be determined by the c o u r t . . . 
In S t a t e v . Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 , 1317 , t h e Utah Supreme 
Cour t r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t h i s r u l e came from the federa l r u l e s of 
e v i d e n c e and t h u s H . . . t h i s Court looks to i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of 
t he f e d r a l r u l e s by the f e d e r a l c o u r t s t o a id in i n t e r p r e t i n g 
t h e Utah r u l e s . " An e x a m i n a t i o n of t h o s e r u l e s shows t h a t a 
p r e t r i a l hearing should have been h e l d . 
In Uni ted S t a t e s v . A u s t i n , 786 F.2d 986 (10th C i r . , 
1 9 8 6 ) , t he Court obse rved " . . .a d i s t r i c t j u d g e , under Rule 
1 0 4 , must d e t e r m i n e , p r i o r t o t h e a d m i s s i o n of a h e a r s a y 
s t a t e m e n t , as a f a c t u a l m a t t e r , t h a t t he Government has shown 
by i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e t h a t i t i s more l i k e l y than not t h a t 
(1) t h e c o n s p i r a c y e x i s t e d ; (2) the d e c l a r a n t and the defendant 
a g a i n s t whom the c o n s p i r a t o r ' s s ta tement i s offered were members 
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of the conspiracy; and (3) the statement was made during the 
course of and in furtherance of the objects of the conspiracy," 
at 989. The Court found the requirement of some trial judges 
that the government "present the required independent evidence 
in a pretrial hearing [to be] particularly helpful in determining 
whether the standard was met," at 990. No such hearing was held 
here, although requested. The failure to hold such a hearing 
should be held to be error. 
The second error committed by the lower court in this 
vein was its determination that a conspiracy existed and Tolman 
and Harman were members of it. Gray requires the prosecution 
show independent evidence of a criminal joint venture before 
hearsay is admitted, 717 P.2d 1313, 1318. The finding need only 
be based on a preponderance of the evidence, but the finding 
must be on the record, J^., at 1319. 
The lower court failed to follow the admonitions of 
G£aj£. It stated no reason other than there is evidence of 
a cover up before admitting hearsay. It stated no reason because 
in fact there was no evidence. The only evidence at that point 
pertaining to Harman and Tolman engaging in any joint venture 
was Harman, as Tolman's superior, ordering him to rewrite a 
report to reflect his own work product while not ordering him 
to do anything with his original report. As has been seen, there 
was nothing "criminal" about that order, thus no "criminal" joint 
venture could be shown. Consequently, it was error to admit 
Tolman's hearsay as evidence against Harman. Since this evidence 
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was the only evidence against Harman, it's admission must be 
deemed reversible error, 
III 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ORDER 
THE STATE TO PROVIDE A BILL OF PARTICULARS, 
The appellant, prior to trial, requested that the 
special prosecutors furnish him with a bill of particulars 
setting forth the specific manner in which he was alleged to 
have impaired, altered, destroyed, concealed or removed the 
report referred to in Count II. The prosecutors, while 
purporting to maintain an open file, declined to respond. The 
lower court refused to order them to respond. The lower court, 
in so ruling, erred. 
As long ago as 1942, the Supreme Court said that if 
an accused was in doubt as to the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, the alleged fact or facts which the State 
proposed to prove might be secured by demanding a bill of 
particulars, j31 £££_ ^ _ ROJD b _i njs , 102 U. 119, 127 P. 2d 1042. 
This rationale has been carried forward by Rule 4(e), U.R.Cr.P., 
which permits the defendant to seek facts not set forth in an 
indictment to inform him of the cause of the charge and enable 
him to prepare his defense. Such information would have been 
particularly valuable in this case. 
It must be remembered that this case was filed as an 
indictment, not an information. Thus, the appellant was deprived 
of all of the information which ordinarily can be gathered in 
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a preliminary hearing. Among that information would certainly 
have been the facts sought by the request for a bill of 
particulars. 
The greatest significance of the request was that it 
would have limited the scope of the charge against the appellant, 
State v. Spencer, 101 U. 274, 117 P.2d 455 (1941), overruled 
on another issue, 4 U.2d 404, 295 P.2d 345. In this case, the 
special prosecutors presented a variety of ways the appellant, 
in their view, tampered with evidence. At this date it remains 
impossible to determine whether the appellant was convicted for 
attempting to tamper with evidence because he told Tolman to 
rewrite it and thus "altered" it, because he did not put a copy 
in the so-called master file and thus "concealed" it, because 
Tolman told Larsen to burn Larsen's copy and thus "destroyed" 
it, or because Ralph Crockett withheld his copy in discovery 
and thus "concealed" it. It is unclear even which of the many 
copies of the report was the subject of the charge. 
Requiring the prosecutors to comply with Rule 4 and 
supply a bill of particulars would have mitigated the confusion 
caused by the charge and, as the rule contemplates, would have 
enabled the defendant to prepare his defense. The lower court's 
refusal to order compliance clearly deprived the defendant of 
his Rule 4 rights, prejudiced the preparation of his defense 
by leaving open the scope of the charge and perhaps thereby 
denied him due process of law. 
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CONCLUSION 
If the conviction is reversed on the basis of Point 
I, the appellant should be discharged and the case dismissed. 
If it is reversed on the basis of Point II or III, a new trial 
should be ordered* 
Respectfully submitted this 2^ 7^- day of February, 
1988. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four tru^ and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were hand delivered to the 
Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol,! Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114, on this _& C day of February, 1988.1 ,i y^f 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Indictment, 
2. Motion for proof of conspiracy. 
3. Motion for a bill of particulars, 
4. Rule 104(a), U.R.E. 
5. Rule 4, U.R.Cr.P. 
6. Section 76-4-101 
7. Section 76-8-510 
8. Exhibit 23 - July 30/ 1981 County Attorney office policy 
concerning release of investigative reports. 
RODNEY G. SNOW (3028) 
200 American Savings Plaza 
77 West 200 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 322-2516 
LARRY R. KELLER (1785) 
#8 East Broadway 
Judge Building, Suite 426 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-7282 
Special Counsel and Prosecutors Pro Tempore — 
Salt Lake County Special Grand Jury, 1986 Te rra 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN, and 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
Case No. O 
I N D I C T M E N T 
VIO. U.C.A. S 76-4-201 
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY); 
U.C.A. § 76-8-508 
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS); 
U.C.A. S 76-8-510 
(TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE); 
U.C.A. § 76-8-201 
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT) 
THE 1986 SPECIAL SALT LAKE COUNTY GRAND JURY CHARGES: 
COUNT I 
(CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY) 
Beginning from on or about August 1, .^983 through on or about 
August 31, 1983, in Salt Lake County, intending that conduct consti-
tuting a crime be performed, and believing that an official proceeding 
or investigation was pending or about to be instigated, Defendants 
Donald Claude Harman and Ralph Tolman, then investigators of the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office, conspired, combined, confederated and 
agreed with each other to conceal or remove a report, to impair the 
report's verity or availability, or to make, present or use a false 
report to deceive a public servant or servants, said reports having 
been prepared by Defendant Tolman regarding the origin of a fire that 
occurred on or about May 1, 1983 at the Fashion Place Professional 
Plaza, Salt Lake County, that involved the destruction of County and 
private property. 
In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects 
thereof, the following overt acts were committed: 
(a) On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman, the then 
Chief Investigator of the Salt Lake County Attorney's office, 
rejected Defendant Tolman1s August 1, 1983, seven-page report 
about the origin of the Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire; 
(b) On or about August 1, 1983, Defendant Harman issued 
instructions to Defendant Tolman to write a brief or one-page 
report closing his investigation into the origin of the Fashion 
Place Professional Plaza fire; 
(c) On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Tolman submitted 
to Defendant Harman a one-page report which eliminated any refer-
ence to Defendant Tolman1s opinion as to the origin of the fire; 
(d) On or about August 25, 1983, Defendant Harman accepted 
and approved Defendant Tolman's report of August 25, 1983 as 
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Defendant Tolman1s official report regarding his investigation of 
the Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire[; 
all in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-4-201, a felony of the Third 
Degree. 
COUNT II 
(TAMPERING WITH EVIDENCE!) 
That during the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believ-
ing that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about 
to be instituted/ Defendants Donald Claude Hajrman and Ralph Tolman did 
alter/ destroy/ conceal/ or remove Ralph Tolman1s investigative report 
of August 1/ 1983/ with the purpose to impair it verity or avail-
ability in an official proceeding or investigation which was then 
pending or about to be instituted; all in viblation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-510/ a felony of the Second Degree. 
COUNT III 
(TAMPERING WITH A WITNESS - DONALD CLAUDE HARMAN) 
That during the month of August 1983/ in Salt Lake County/ believ-
ing that an official proceeding or. investigation was pending or about 
to be instituted/ Defendant Donald Claude Harman did attempt to induce 
or otherwise cause Defendant Ralph Tolman to withhold testimony/ infor-
mation/ document/ or thingf to wit: Ralph Tolman1s seven-page 
investigative report of August lf 1983 regarding the May lf 1983 
Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire; all in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-5108/ a felony of the Third Degre^. 
-3-
COUNT IV 
(TAMPERING WITH WITNESS - RALPH TOLMAN) 
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, believing 
that an official proceeding or investigation was pending or about to 
be instituted, Defendant Ralph Tolman did attempt to induce or other-
wise cause C. Dean Larsen to withhold testimonyf information, docu-
ment, or thing, in that Defendant Tolman requested C. Dean Larsen to 
destroy or dispose of Defendant Tolman1s seven-page investigative 
report of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1, 1983 Fashion Place 
Professional Plaza fire; all in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-8-508, a felony of the Third Degree. 
COUNT V 
(OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT - UNAUTHORIZED ACTS OR FAILURE OF DUTY) 
During the month of August 1983, in Salt Lake County, Defendants 
Ralph Tolman and Donald Claude Harman, then investigators for the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's office and public servants, with the intent to 
benefit themselves or another, or to harm another, knowingly committed 
unauthorized acts which purported to be acts of their office, or know-
ingly refrained from performing a duty imposed upon them by law or 
clearly inherent in the nature of their office, in that said Defen-
dants altered, destroyed, concealed or removed Ralph Tolman1s 
seven-page investigative report of August 1, 1983 regarding the May 1, 
1983 Fashion Place Professional Plaza fire, with the purpose to impair 
its verity or availability in an official proceeding or investigation 
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which was pending or about to be instituted; all in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. S 76-8-201, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
DATED this 9th day of October, 1986. 
rUDY JOHNSON 
Foreperson, Salt Lake County Special 
Grand Jury, 1986 Term 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ^ day of October, 1986. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
Witnesses examined before the Grand Jury on these charges: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
C. Dean Larsen 
Wendell Coombs 
Ralph Tolman 
Bill Hyde 
Donald Claude Harman 
Walter R. "Bud" Ellett 
Aaron Alma Nelson 
Gary Ferguson 
Gary Johnson 
Roger Livingston 
Theodore L. Cannon, Jr 
01in Yearby 
Jim Ashby 
Sam Dawson 
Ralph Crockett 
A. Evan Stephens 
Glen Bammerlin 
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EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant Harman 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN 
and RALPH TOLMAN, 
Defendants. 
i MOTION FOR PROOF 
I OF CONSPIRACY 
i Case No. CR-86-1522 
i (Judge Uno) • 
Defendant Harman, by his attorney, moves the Court, pursuant 
to Rule 104(a), U.R.E., to require the prosecution to submit thresh-
old proof of the existence of a conspiracy in advance of trial 
before being permitted to introduce evidence under Rule 801(d) (2) (E) , 
U.R.E. 
EDWARD K. BRASS w 
Attorney for Defendant Harman 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to Larry R. Keller, 8 East 
Broadway, #426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; Rodney G. Snow, 200 
American Sav/ings Plaza, 77 West 200 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101; and Loni F. DeLand, 132 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 8 4102, on this >*V day of October, 1996. 
EDWARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant Harman 
321 South 600 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 322-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff, ) MOTION FOR A BILL 
) OF PARTICULARS 
VS. ) 
CLAUDE DONALD HARMAN ) Case No. CR-86-1522 
and RALPH TOLMAN, ) (Judge Uno) 
Defendants. ) 
Defendant Harman, by his attorney, moves the Court, pursuant 
to Section 77-35-4(e), U.C.A. (1953, as amended), to order the 
prosecution to furnish him with a bill of particulars as follows: 
1. The specific manner in which this defendant is alleged 
to have impaired, altered, destroyed, concealed or removed the 
report referred to in Count II. 
a. A description of the official proceeding or 
investigation alleged to have been pending or about to be instituted 
as set forth in Count II. 
2. The specific acts which this defendant is alleged 
in Count III to have committed to induce Ralph Tolman to withhold 
testimony, information, document or thing. 
a. A description of the official proceeding alleged 
to have been pending or about to be instituted as set forth in 
Count III. 
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3. The specific benefit this defendant or another would 
receive as alleged in Count V. 
4. The specific unauthorized acts this defendant is 
alleged to have performed in Count V. 
5. The specific duty this defendant is alleged to have 
failed to perform in Count V. 
Dated this C/ ( <iaY of October, |.986. 
o 
t . 
tfARD K. BRASS 
Attorney for Defendant Harman 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed, postage prepaid, to Rqdney G. Snow, 200 American 
Savings*<Plaza, 77 West 20 0 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 8 4101; Larry 
R. Keller, 8 East Broadway, #426, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111; and 
Loni F. DeLand, 132 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
on this *2 ; day of October, 1986. 
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UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 104 
—Offer of proof. 
Party's failure to make a proffer of proof as 
to what his evidence would show precluded 
him from asserting on appeal that the exclu-
sion of his evidence was error. Downey State 
Bank v. Major-Blakeney Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 
(Utah 1978). 
Party was not entitled to raise on appeal is-
sue concerning exclusion of evidence by the 
trial court where party at trial did not make 
any offer of proof as to what evidence would be 
adduced, nor the purpose it would serve. Brad-
ford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240 (Utah 
1980). 
An erroneous exclusion of evidence will not 
be set aside unless a proffer of evidence ap-
pears of record, and the excluded evidence 
would probably have haoVa substantial influ-
ence in bringing about a different verdict. 
State v. Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986). 
—Substantial right or prejudice. 
Even if evidence is erroneously admitted, 
that fact alone is insufficient to set aside a ver-
dict unless it has had a substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict. Bambrough v. 
Bethers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976). 
A judgment will not be reversed for an al-
leged error in the exclusion of evidence unless 
it appears in the repord that the error was prej-
udicial. Downey State Bank v. Major-Blakeney 
Corp., 578 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1978). 
Plain error. 
Where gruesome color slides of murder vic-
tim were displayed to jury and any material 
fact which could conceivably have been ad-
duced by viewing the slides had already been 
established by uncontroverted testimony, con-
viction was reversed although counsel for de-
fendant had not properly objected to admission 
of the slides. State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 
P.2d 512 (1968). 
Cited in Furniture Mfrs. Sales, Inc. v. 
Deamer, 680 P.2d 398 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Bullock, 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985); State v. 
Gray, 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Jensen, 727 P.2d 201 (Utah 1986); State v. Mil-
ler, 727 P.2d 203 (Utah 1986); State v. Velarde, 
No: 19682 (Utah Sup. Ct. filed Dec. 4, 1986); 
Paffel v. Paffel, No. 19462 (Utah Sup. Ct. filed 
Dec. 8, 1986); State v. Loe, No. 20789 (Utah 
Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 13, 1987). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 68. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 517 to 523; 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 601 to 604, 670, 737, 738, 797, 880, 
881; 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 249; 58 Am. 
Jur. 2d New Trial §§ 120, 121, 123, 124; 75 
Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 605. 
C.J.S. — 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1724 
et seq.; 24B C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1915(1) to 
1918(5). 
A.L.R. — Prejudicial effect of unauthorized 
view by jury in civil case of scene of accident or 
premises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. 
Dismissal of action because of party's perjury 
or suppression of evidence, 11 A.L.R.3d 1153. 
Effect of witness' violation of order of exclu-
sion, 14 A.L.R.3d 16. 
Prejudicial effect of holding accused in con-
tempt of court in presence of jury, 29 A.L.R.3d 
1399. 
Violation of federal constitutional rule 
(Mapp v. Ohio) excluding evidence obtained 
through unreasonable search or seizure, as 
constituting harmless or reversible error, 30 
A.L.R.3d 128. 
Withholding or suppression of evidence by 
prosecution in criminal case as vitiating con-
viction, 34 A.L.R.3d 16. 
Sufficiency in federal court of motion in li-
mine to preserve for appeal objection to evi-
dence absent contemporary objection at trial, 
76 A.L.R. Fed. 619. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 1050 
et seq.; Criminal Law «= 1161,1169 to 1170(5). 
Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions concern-
ing the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the 
provisions of Subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by 
the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence de-
pends upon the ftilfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, 
or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the 
fulfillment of the condition. 
643 
77-35-3 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
77-35-3, Rule 3 — Service and filing of papers, (a) All written 
motions, notices and pleadings shall be filed with the court and served on 
all other parties. 
(b) Whenever service is required or permitted to be made upon a pkrty 
represented by an attorney, the service shall be made upon the attorney, 
unless service upon the party himself is ordered by the court. Service upon 
the attorney or upon a party shall be made in the manner provided in civil 
actions. 
(c) The party preparing an order shall, upon execution by the c< u^rt, 
mail to each party a copy thereof and certify to the court such mailing. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-3, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, § 1. 
77-35-4. Rule 4 — Prosecution of public offenses, (a) Unless other-
wise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by indictment or information 
sworn to by a person having reason to believe the offense has been commit-
ted. 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the 
defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by 
common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of 
the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of the charge. An infor-
mation may contain or be accompanied by a statement of facts sufficient 
to make out probable cause to sustain the offense charged where appropri-
ate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value and owner-
ship need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such tjiings 
as money, securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments 
may be described by any name or description by which they are generally 
known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a popy. 
However, details concerning such things may be obtained through a bill 
of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters of judicial i^ otice 
need be stated. 
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language froin an 
indictment or information. 
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended 
at any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged 
and the substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After ver-
dict, an indictment or information may be amended so as to statte the 
offense with such particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the 
same offense upon the same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required 
to inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so 
as to enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written 
motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment 
or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may per-
mit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particu-
lars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented at any time 
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subject to such conditions as justice may require. The requestor and con-
tents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual 
information needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular 
offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any 
name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso 
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their 
usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired 
a legal meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invali-
date the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or infor-
mation was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to 
endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by 
the court on application of the defendant Upon request the prosecuting 
attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names 
of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing 
it to appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or 
counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against 
a natural person. 
History: C. 1953, 77-35-4, enacted by L. 
1980, ch. 14, § 1. 
Cross-References. 
Accused entitled to copy of accusation, 
Const. Art I, § 12. 
Circuit courts, criminal jurisdiction, 78-4-5. 
Courts-martial, power generally, 39-1-40. 
Criminal Code definition of "corporation," 
76-2-201. 
Criminal Code not strictly construed, 
76-1-106. 
Criminal responsibility of corporation, 
76-2-204. 
Criminal responsibility of person for con-
duct in name of corporation, 76-2-205. 
Double jeopardy, Const. Art. I, § 12; 
76-1-401 to 76-1-405, 77-1-6. 
General definitions for Criminal Code, 
76-1-601. 
"Indictment" defined, 77-1-3. 
"Information" defined, 77-1-3. 
Judicial knowledge, 78-25-1; Rules of Evi-
dence, Rules 9 to 12. 
Justices' courts, criminal jurisdiction, 
78-5-4. 
Juveniles, jurisdiction, transfer, 78-3a-16 to 
78-3a-19. 
Names of witnesses to be endorsed on 
indictment, 77-12-1. 
Nonmaterial errors and mistakes, 77-35-30. 
Preliminary examination, 77-35-7. 
Proof of corporate existence, 77-17-5. 
Prosecution by indictment or information 
after examination and commitment or 
waiver thereof, Const. Art. I, § 13. 
Removal of officers, Const. Art. VI, §21; 
77-6. 
Statutory construction and definitions in 
general, 68-3-11, 68-3-12. 
Collateral References. 
Criminal Law <§=> 205, 206; Corporations 
<§=» 532; Indictment and Information <&=> 1-5, 
31, 34(4), 87,106,117,119,121.1,156. 
19 CJS Corporations § 1366; 22 CJS Crimi-
nal Law §§ 300, 301; 42 CJS Indictments and 
Informations §§ 1-4, 48, 65, 107, 123-125, 144, 
155,156, 234. 
19 AmJur 2d 831, Corporations § 1439; 21 
AmJur 2d 677, 716, Criminal Law §§ 408, 433; 
41 AmJur 2d 881-889, 980-986, Indictments 
and Informations §§ 2-7,10-13,159-170. 
Name: sufficiency of indictment, informa-
tion or criminal complaint omitting or 
misstating middle name or initial of person 
named therein, 15 ALR 3d 968. 
Necessity and materiality of statement of 
place of death in indictment or information 
charging homicide, 59 ALR 2d 901. 
237 
76-3-405 CRIMINAL CODE 
History: 0. 1953, 76-3-404, enacted by 24B C.J.S. Criminal LaW § 1983(2)b 
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-404. (a). 
21 Am. Jur. 2d 547, Criminal Law § 584. 
Collateral References. 
C^inal Law^l208( 2) . . . S S S ^ T A ¥ W l . t f * * 
76-3-405. Limitation on sentence where conviction or prioi: sentence 
set aside.—Where a conviction or sentence has been set aside I on direct 
review or on collateral attack, the court shall not impose a new sentence 
for the same offense or for a different offense based on the same conduct 
which is more severe than the prior sentence less the portion of the prior 
sentence previously satisfied. 
History: C. 1953, 76-3-405, enacted by 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law §463(9). 
L. 1973, en. 196, § 76-3-405. 
_, __ _ _ _ Propriety of increased punishment on 
CoUateral References.
 n e w t r i a l f o r 8 a m Q offense, 12 |A. L. R. 3d 
Criminal Law<§=>260(13). 978. 
CHAPTER 4 
INCHOATE OFFENSES 
Part 1. Attempt 
Section 
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense. 
76-4-102. Attempt—Classification of offenses. 
Fart 2. Criminal Conspiracy 
76-4-201. Conspiracy—Elements of offense. 
76-4-202. Conspiracy—Classification of offenses. 
Part 3. Exemptions and Restrictions 
76-4-301. Specific attempt or conspiracy offense prevails, 
76-4-302. Conviction of inchoate and principal offense or attempt and conspiracy to 
commit offense prohibited. 
Part 1 
Attempt 
76-4-101. Attempt—Elements of offense.—(1) For purpose^ of this 
part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting) with the 
kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of thk offense, 
he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward cqmmission 
of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial 
step unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent t<^  commit 
the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise : 
(a) Because the offense attempted was actually committed; lor 
(b) Due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them 
to be. 
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Falsity of contemplated testimony as gift by, prospective witness, 110 A. L. R. 
condition of offense of bribery of, at- 582. 
tempt to bribe, or acceptance of bribe or 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
Evidence. fendant as to subornation charged. State 
In prosecution for subornation of per- v- Gleason, 86 U. 26, 40 P. 2d 222. 
jury, record of plea of guilty of perjury Where defendant and witness were ae-
by person alleged to have been procured complices in perjury, corroboration of 
to commit perjury was inadmissible. witness's testimony was unnecessary to 
State v. Justesen, 35 U. 105, 99 P. 456. convict defendant of subornation. State 
In prosecution of attorney for suborna- v- McGee, 26 U. (2d) 373, 489 P. 2d 1188. 
tion of jury, evidence was sufficient to 
sustain conviction although only evidence Status or crime. 
was testimony of person alleged to have Crime of subornation of perjury was 
been suborned, since perjury and suborna- separate and distinct offense from that 
tion of perjury were distinct offenses and of perjury. State v. Justesen, 35 U. 105, 
such witness was not accomplice of de- 99 P. 456. 
76-8-509. Extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding.—(1) A 
person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if by the use of force or 
by any threat which would constitute a means of committing the crime of 
theft by extortion under this code, if the threat were employed to obtain 
property, or by promise of any reward or pecuniary benefits, he attempts 
to induce an alleged victim of a crime to secure the dismissal of or to pre-
vent the filing of a criminal complaint, indictment, or information. 
(2) "Victim," as used in this section, includes a child or other person 
under the care or custody of a parent or guardian. 
History: O. 1953, 76-8-509, enacted by 86 C.J.S. Threats and Unlawful Com-
L. 1973, ciu 196, § 76-8-509. munications § 4. 
31 Am. Jur. 2d 911, Extortion, Black-
mail, and Threats § 14. Cross-Keferences. 
Accepting bribe, or bribery, to prevent 
criminal prosecution, 76-8-308. 
Criminal liability of corporation for ex-
CoUateral References. tortion, false pretenses, or similar offenses, 
Threats<S=l(l). 49 A. L. R. 3d 820. 
76-8-510. Tampering with evidence.—A person commits a felony of the 
second degree if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is 
pending or about to be instituted, he: 
(1) Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes anything with a purpose 
to impair its verity or availability in the proceeding or investigation; or 
(2) Makes, presents, or uses anything which he knows to be false with 
a purpose to deceive a public servant who is or may be engaged in a 
proceeding or investigation. 
History: C. 1953, 76-8-510, enacted by CoUateral References. 
L. 1973, clL 196, § 76-8-510. Obstructing Justice<&=5. 
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 10. 
29 Am. Jur. 2d 338, Evidence § 292. 
76-8-511, Falsification or alteration of government record.—A person 
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he: 
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SAT~ LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEYS OFFICE 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS 
POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMORANDUM 
INFORMATION NO. 81-1 
TO: ALL INVESTIGATORS 
FROM: CHIEF INVESTIGATOR 
DATE: JUNE 30, 1981 
RE: RELEASE OF INFORMATION 
The office policy of the Salt Lake County Attorneys Bureau 
of Investigation regarding release of information developed 
during the course of any investigation will be as follows: 
1. All investigative subpoena information will be 
kept confidential and released only on a need to know basis 
to those people involved in the case and to administrative 
supervisors. 
2. All investigative reports will be kept confidential. 
3. All Investigators are urged to maintain some type 
of security on their files. 
4. The main file cabinet with investigative reports 
will be kept under security. 
5. No information on any cases under investigation 
or completed will be discussed with any media person without 
first being cleared with the Chief Investigator or in his absence 
that person that has been designated to act in his absence. 
6. The only person to over-ride these procedures-will 
be the division chief, the assistant county attorney or the 
county attorney. 
7. These orders are not to be restrictive to the factual 
release of information regarding facts and events that are 
occurring while you are on the crime scene. Example: Fire 
Paee 2 
INFORMATION 8I-. 
8. All reports and information generated through an 
investigation shall be considered sole propdrty of the Salt 
Lake County Attorneys Office. No information or reports shall 
be released to any outside agencies or other people involved 
in the investigation or any other source witlhout specific approval 
from the Chief Investigator or in his absencje that person that 
has been designated to act in his absence. 
9. After an investigation has been [completed a letter 
of completion should be sent to those personls involved stating 
the results of the investigation. 
10. All Investigators are urged to ppcovi 
media informat ion that is beneficial to the 
de to the news 
bublic. 
11. News releases are encouraged wheh handled through 
the proper procedures. News releases are tc be released through 
the designated media person after first beinfe cleared by the 
Chief Investigator or in his absence that pejrson that has been 
designated to act in his capacity. 
DHrdaa 
